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RELIGIOSITY AND ALTRUISTIC ORIENTATION IN  
ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 
 
 
Summary 
 In this paper, we examine the relationship between religiosity and altruistic value 
orientation in economically developed European societies. The data come from the European 
Social Survey (ESS). Religiosity within ESS is measured by three dimensions – self-evalua-
tion, frequency of attendance of religious services apart from special occasions and frequency 
of praying apart from at religious services. Altruistic value orientation is measured by rating of 
personal importance of helping people and caring for others well-being. Using cross-sectional 
data from the last round of the ESS (from 2016), from thirteen economically developed Euro-
pean countries, we revealed very weak relationship between all three dimensions of religiosity 
and altruistic orientation. Secondly, using data from all the prior rounds of the ESS, from 
2002 to 2016, we also examined trends of both religiosity and altruistic value orientation within 
the same societies. The results indicate decline of religiosity and rise of altruistic orientation 
in all of examined countries. 
Key words: religiosity, altruistic orientation, (de)secularization, Europe, European 
Social Survey. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The post-World War II period has been marked in sociology (among other 
topics) by a dynamic debate over the question of whether religion has lost its social 
relevance or it is, on the contrary, still a very important component of social life. 
After a period in which the secularization paradigm was dominant (the sixties, seven-
ties and even a good part of the eighties of the twentieth century), a critical turn-
around followed, and research in the field of the sociology of religion focused on the 
various aspects of the revitalization of religion. It was called the desecularization pro-
cess. From that moment, one of the important initial research premises of contem-
porary sociology of religion is that no general and grand conclusions can be given to 
the question whether religion is still an important social factor or it’s not. Instead, 
analyses must focus on individual examples of both societies and religions. Ergo, 
many studies have shown that secularization has indeed taken roots in some socie-
ties, while in other communities this has not been the case. Because of that, the mi-
cro or middle-range position is the only one that is adequate for understanding the 
complex role of religion in contemporary society.  
Also, one of the most important questions is whether religion is equally 
important at the individual and at the collective level in contemporary societies. In 
other words, contemporary research on religiosity must take into account the differ-
rence between personal spirituality and the social function of religion. On the basis 
of this difference we are setting our research question in this paper: taking altruistic 
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value orientation as an important element of sociability, we want to examine is it 
influenced by religiosity. In this way we can get indirect answer to the question: does 
religion have a social function today or it is important only on the individual and 
introspective level? 
 In accordance with aforementioned research imperatives, we decided to put 
our analysis at the level of middle-range theory (Merton 1998)1 and we are going to 
try to explain the connection between altruism and religiosity in the case of Euro-
pean economically developed Christian-dominated countries. These countries are: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. We first want to examine the 
degree of religiosity in the mentioned countries, and then we will examine whether 
there is a connection between altruism and religiosity. In these developed societies 
secularization processes were convergent with the processes of modernization (off 
course, we are taking into account the differences between the mentioned countries) 
so that’s why they are interesting to analyse the nexus between altruism and religio-
sity. Also, previous researches have already shown a decline of social functions of re-
ligiosity, so we continue to study the trend on the most recent data.  
 
PROCESSES OF (DE)SECULARIZATION AND THE DECLINE  
OF RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, the secularization paradigm was dominant 
in the sociology of religion. One of the most influential authors of the sociology of re-
ligion, Peter Berger (1973), said that a multitude factors led to a diminishing impor-
tance of religion and the role of the church in (Western) societies. The main cause of 
secularization Berger, like Weber, saw in the Christian dogma and its connection with 
the Enlightenment.2 Berger presume that other factors also contributed to seculari-
zation (social, economic, and technological changes that took place in Western socie-
ties in the mid-twentieth century were a catalyst for reducing the influence of reli-
gion in society), but Berger was more concerned with the link between Christian dogma 
and secularization so he didn’t analyse other causes in detail. On the other hand, 
some other authors (such as, for example, Brian Wilson) focused on social change as 
a major cause in transforming religiosity and withdrawing religion from public life. 
Wilson (1976, 1982) emphasizes the convergence between modernization (industriali-
zation, urbanization and technological advancement) and secularization. Wilson pro-
poses a number of concepts that can be applied in different historical situations, con-
sidering different contexts. This author said that the global transition from “co-
mmunity“ to “society“ (as Tönnies defines it) influenced on the reducing the role of 
 
1 In short, Merton (1998) believes that grand theories are part of the history of social thought, 
and that contemporary research requires focus on individual cases using a number of different 
theoretical approaches. In this way, he formulates an idea of middle-range theory which can 
be applied to the study of different social phenomena, including religion. 
2 Weber believed that religion was the basis of worldviews everywhere, except in modern West. 
The Enlightenment succeeded to neutralize the influence of the religious. According to Weber, 
in the West at that stage of development science has encompassed almost the entire world-
view. Paradoxically, the answer to the question of why the Enlightenment succeeded in initiating 
the process of dissolving the world lies again in the specifics of the religious ethos of Western 
Christianity (Jovanović 2016b: 456; Jovanović Ajzenhamer 2019: 162).  
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religion in societies. The most important force in this general context is process of 
rationalization, emphasizes Wilson. Rationalization manifests itself primarily as a 
transformation of social control, which loses its moral dimension and becomes more 
technical and anonymous. Like Weber,3 Wilson also said that rationalization mani-
fests itself primarily in the growing bureaucratization of social interactions in diffe-
rent areas (Tschannen 1991: 398–399; Hamilton 2001: 185–214). 
The most influential authors in the field of the sociology of religion in the 
1970s and 1980s (David Martin, Richard Fenn, Peter Berger, Brian Wilson, Daniel 
Bell, Thomas Luckmann etc.) emphasized the various causes of secularization. They 
were disagreed about the way in which this process is proceeded, and to what extent 
it encompassed different societies, but still, the conclusion that secularization had 
taken over Western societies was the most common among famous sociologists of 
religion until the 1990s (ibid.). All the authors that we mentioned were very dedica-
ted to prove and explain the new process of reducing the influence of religion in so-
cial life. 
Despite the fact that secularization paradigm was the dominant theoretical 
framework of sociological research in the second half of the twentieth century, a 
series of empirical studies that have shown that religion is not an insignificant factor 
in the lives of individuals (especially in the United States and other non-European 
societies), the emergence of alternative religiosity (New Religious Movements4) and 
increase of the number of fundamentalist movements around the world, challenged 
the hypothesis that secularization is the dominant social process when it comes to 
religion. Berger (1999) himself said that he was wrong in his estimations. He acclai-
med that the process of desecularization is now one of the major social process 
towards the end of the the twentieth century. After these changes, contemporary 
researches on religion become defined by the imperative of heterogeneity. In other 
words, macro perspectives and holistic paradigms are avoided, so societies and reli-
gions are analysed first in individual contexts, and then in comparative analysis. Va-
rious historical, political, economic, and dogmatic contexts are being studied, so to-
day we talk about the development of religion in post-socialist Europe, in Western 
European societies, in American society, etc. Of course, the African and Asian per-
spectives, as well as the differences between Catholics, Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, 
etc., are not ignored. Correlations between religiosity and various indicators such as 
class, age, gender, ethnicity, etc. are also analysed. Like we said in the Introduction, 
 
3 The process of rationalization is one of the key concepts in the Weber’s sociology. This pro-
cess is immanent to the West, but has permeated different societies (not only Western) in 
different volumes. The process of rationalization can be identified in different social spheres, 
from economics and politics to religion. Although Weber has not given a exact definition of 
rationalization, this concept remains paramount to his sociology. There are several types of 
rationalization such as practical, substantive, theoretical and formal and all of these can in-
fluence different social phenomena. Rationalization in the religious domain, among other 
things, means the removal of magical elements and it is often parallel with the processes of 
rationalization in other spheres: in art, economics and politics (Jovanović, 2016a: 94–99; Jo-
vanović Ajzehnamer, 2019: 156–160). In this paper we won’t elaborate on this extremely com-
plex topic; we will just underline the conceptual continuity that Wilson follows when he uses 
Weber's argument to complete his researches on secularization. 
4 Eileen Barker (2004) formulated the concept of the New Religious Movements as a generic 
term for all forms of alternative eclectic religiosity that have emerged since the 1970s, pri-
marily in the United States. 
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middle-rang theory is now the most prominent theoretical and epistemological 
starting position in religion studies. In this way, sociologists can complete far more 
accurate sociological picture of the survival or disappearance of religion in different 
societies.  
When it comes to Europe, studies published at the end of the last century 
shows that religious situation at the Old Continent is very complex. Some indicators 
show that religion is losing its traditional role, that religion is individualized, 
alternative forms of spirituality are becoming more common, fewer and fewer people 
pray and go to church, etc. Also, there is an increasing occurrence of eclectic religio-
sity in which individuals combine different elements of traditional religiosity with 
cyber religiosity, mysticism, esotericism, etc. This is what Ulrich Beck (2010: 49) calls 
Do it yourself religiosity. William Sims Bainbridge (1997: 363–383) thought that 
this kind of practice is adequate example of application of the theory and logic of 
rational choice in the field of religion. In other words, individuals, as if they are in a 
large supermarket of religious ideas and practices, choose what they like best, and 
then practice this religious mix at the individual level.  
While there is no doubt that religiosity in Europe has changed and that tra-
ditional religious practices and beliefs are becoming less important, on the other hand, 
most respondents in the academic researches at the end of the twentieth century 
said that rituals such as weddings and funerals at church, or baptism, were still very 
important to them. Therefore, it is very difficult to reach a clear conclusion when it 
comes to the role of religion in European societies. At first sight, one might say that 
religion lost its social significance, and that the various eclectic forms of religiosity 
become dominant, however, the situation is not so simple. When it comes to post-
socialist countries, the situation is quite different then in Western European coun-
tries. In most post-socialist countries, we can mark the revitalization of religion, 
even at the level of collectivist feelings (Blagojević, 2015). Ergo, when we talk about 
Europe in general, the situation is quite diverse, but when it comes to Western Europe, 
secularization is indeed quite entrenched, and this is especially evident when it co-
mes to the social role of religion. 
Grace Davie, first on the UK example (1994), and then later at the sample of 
other Western European countries (2005), has shown that indicators of belief in God 
and dogma are far more powerful and represented than ritual practices and feelings 
of belonging to certain religious communities. She calls this phenomenon believing 
without belonging. This is especially true when we are talking about Protestants, but 
it is present in Catholic population also. Davie is one of the more vocal proponents of 
the middle-range theory and idea that societies must be viewed as separate objects of 
study. She explains that the traditional belief in the monotheistic god is now combi-
ned with various Eastern practices and beliefs (we have discussed about that eclectic 
religiosity earlier), and that this is part of the personal equation of the believer. On 
the other hand, indicators of a sense of belonging to a religious community are dimi-
nishing, despite the fact that some traditional rituals are still practiced. One of her 
main conclusions is that, if we analyse Western Europe, spirituality and religiosity 
have not lost their significance, but only on an individual level, while the collective 
role of religion has diminished.  
In the trace of the Davie’s conclusions, we are going to analyse new data 
obtained in 2016. We want to examine is the continuity of belief without belonging 
continued, and we want to research how the lack of a connection between altruism 
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and religiosity contributes to the explanation of the loss of the social role of religion 
in Western European societies. But first let’s look briefly at one recent paper that 
was conducted on the same data we are going to use, but the author analysed the 
population of young people. This excurse will be a good introduction to the story of 
the predictions of the future of religion in Europe, and the role it will play in the 
social life of future generations.  
Stephen Bullivant (2018), on the basis of ESS data (2014-2016), in the ca-
tegory of youth aged sixteen to twenty-nine, saw an increase in those who did not 
declare themselves as members of any religion. Interestingly, in eight of the thirteen 
countries we analyzed, more than 50% of young people declare that they do not belong 
to any of these religions. These countries are: Spain, Norway, Finland, Denmark, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the remaining five 
analyzed countries, youth non-religiosity is also (relatively) high. These remain coun-
tries are: Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and Germany (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Detailed breakdown of 16-29 year-old religious affiliation in 22 
European countries (ESS 2014-16) 
 
 
Source: Bullivant 2018: 6.  
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If we observe only population of young Catholics, we can conclude the si-
tuation is somewhat different, since in this case only the youth of Portugal and Ire-
land declare themselves as believers in more than 50% of cases. In all other coun-
tries that we are going to analyse, a low degree of religiosity has been identified among 
young Catholics (Bullivant 2018: 8). It is easy to identify decline of conventional 
religiosity among young people, and that’s the case especially with Catholic countries 
and, above all, economically developed ones. 
As we have said, Bolivian’s research gives us the jolt to continue analysing 
religiosity in economically developed countries, but taking into account the whole 
population, not just the young people. Our hypothesis is that the data from 2016 will 
show us the same trends that Grace Davie has already observed. We assume that in 
Western (economically developed) societies will emerge weak link between religio-
sity and social cohesiveness (in this case, we examine altruism as one of the more 
important variables of social dynamics and integration). In other words, we assume 
that the degree of altruism is impacted by factors other than religiosity, which 
indirectly can tells us that religion in these countries is losing social functions. As we 
said, one of the basic and most important ethical principles of most of the world 
religions is the care of others and it emphasizes altruism, so if these value orien-
tations are induced by other factors, and not by religiosity, we can indirectly con-
clude that religion has lost that kind of social role. Also, based on the ESS data, we 
will show that there is a continuity of decline in religiosity, especially when it comes 
to collectivist and institutional dimensions. If we keep in mind the conclusions from 
the Bullivant research (2018), we can assume that this trend will continue. 
 
RISE OF ALTRUISTIC VALUE ORIENTATION 
 
The rise of altruism can be observed in the light of value changes in post-
industrial societies. More concretely, as Inglehart (2018) states, when a society attains 
sufficiently high levels of existential security that a large share of the population 
grows up taking survival for granted, it brings coherent and roughly predictable so-
cial and cultural changes, producing an intergenerational shift from values shaped 
by scarcity (so called survival values), toward increasing emphasis on so called 
postmaterialist and self-expression values.5 Ingelhart and Welzel (2005: 143) argue 
that these values reduce the need for group protection and weaken pressures for 
group conformity – people adopt increasingly independent conceptions of them-
selves. Creating ties to other people becomes no longer a matter of external con-
straints; it becomes a matter of intrinsic choice, which helps people move beyond the 
narrow boundaries of extended kinship (ibid.). Individuals are less likely to accept 
restrictions of their liberties for the sake of group conformity and start to view other 
types of human beings as intrinsically valuable beings (ibid.).6 
 
5 High levels of existential security could also be conducive to secularization (see also: Kistler et al., 
2017). Ingelhart and Welzel (ibid) argue that unprecedented levels of economic development that a 
growing number of societies have attainedin recent history diminishes material, cognitive, and 
social constraints on human choice, and it reduces the need for group protection. When existential 
threats recede, self-expression values and individual autonomy tend to become more widespread 
(ibid.). See also: Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart, 1990; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995. 
6 Ingelhart and Welzel also state that from the human development perspective, this wide variety of 
psychological and cultural traits does not represent idiosyncratic aspects of given cultures – this 
pattern tends to be linked with socioeconomic conditions, and is it also culturally universal (ibid).  
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In a similar way, Welzel (2013: 10) writes about dominance of so called 
emancipative values7, which emphasize freedom of expression and equality of oppor-
tunities. Using data from the World Values Survey, Welzel showed that emancipative 
values are on the rise within economically developed societies for which longitudinal 
data are available. He argues that emancipative values inspire people to follow their 
intrinsic motivations rather than being remotely controlled, and this intrinsic im-
pulse comes with increased empathy for other people’s legitimate concerns, which 
creates a prosocial form of individualism that sees even remote others as equals – it 
becomes easier for people to join forces for shared concerns.8 
Individualization from this point of view does not undermine society but 
transforms it, shifting the mode of affiliation from imposed to chosen loyalties (ibid: 
194). It is seen as a universal form of humanism that cuts through group boundaries 
and makes people more open to concern for remote and dissimilar others; it emanci-
pates: it occurs when receding existential constraints liberate people from their 
dependence on narrow, uniform, and closed support groups that they have not cho-
sen (ibid: 193-194). Individualization diminishes people’s dependence on support 
groups against their will and at the same time as it increases their chances to join 
and form groups which they prefer – it does not bring the end of people’s tendency 
to connect, but it brings the freedom to connect and disconnect as people choose, 
and social relations, group loyalties, and collective affiliations become more of peo-
ple’s liking (ibid: 194). Thus, individualization frees people to affiliate with commu-
nities as wide, diverse, and open as they like them (ibid: 193-194).  
In another article, Welzel (2010) states that emancipative the individualistic 
nature of emancipative values implies a basic sense of human equality, which makes 
possible a universal form of altruism. According to him, Kagitcibasi (Kagitcibasi, 
1997, 2005, in: ibid.), Schwartz (Schwartz, 2004, in: ibid.), and Etzioni (Etzioni, 1993, in: 
ibid.), also criticize the merging of autonomy and selfishness into individualism – 
they argue that individual autonomy can be altruistic, going together with social 
relatedness, concern for others, and solidarity with others. 
 
METHOD 
 
As we said, our analysis is twofold. On the one hand, we examine the cross-
sectional correlation between religiosity and altruistic value orientation. On the 
other hand, we examine trends of these variables. In both cases, we use data from 
the European Social Survey. Beginning in 2002, every two years, data are being collected 
in a number of European countries. Within each wave of this survey, religiosity is 
measured through three dimensions: intensity of religious beliefs, participation in 
religious services, and frequency of praying.9 On the other hand, the altruistic value 
orientation is measured by one item from the Schwartz’s values framework (Schwartz, 
 
7 See also: Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Hagenaars, Halman, and Moors, 2003; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). 
8 In a similar way, Förster and his colleagues (Förster et al., 2008) write about a shift from 
“prevention focus” to “promotion focus”. 
9 Religiosity refers to the various dimensions associated with religious beliefs and involve-
ment, and there is growing importance of evaluating religiosity in research as a multidimen-
sional concept, focusing on its subjective, cognitive, behavioral, and the social and cultural 
components (Bergan and McConatha, 2001). See also: Yeniaras and Akarsu, 2016, ten Kate et al., 
2017, and Mentus, 2017, 2018, forthcoming). 
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2012). Our isolated samples consist of respondents from thirteen West and North 
European countries. All of the countries in our samples are economically highly 
developed, according to the World Bank classification.10 These are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland and United Kingdom.  
Within the European Social Survey, self-rating of religiosity is measured using 
question: “Using this card, how religious would you say you are?”, where 0 meant “Not 
at all religious”, while 10 meant “Very religious”. On the other side, participation in 
religious services is measured using question: “Apart from religious activities at the 
occasion of social events as weddings, funerals, christenings, and circumcisions, about 
how often do you attend religious services these days?”, where 1 meant “More than 
once a week”, while 7 meant “Never”. On the other side, frequency of praying was mea-
sured using question: “About how often do you pray?” and the answers were the sa-
me as for participation in religious services. Altruistic value orientation is measured 
using question: “Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person 
is or is not like you. It’s very important to him to help the people around him. He wants 
to care for their well-being”. The answers are given on a six-point scale, where 1 meant 
“Very much like me”, and 6 meant “Not like me at all”. In our analysis, frequency of 
attendance of religious services apart from special occasions, frequency of praying 
apart from at religious services and altruistic value orientation are coded inversely. 
We examined the cross-sectional relationship between religiosity and altru-
istic value orientation using data from the last round of the European Social Survey, 
from 2016. An isolated sample for this purpose was consisted of 24,869 respondents, 
with a minimum age of 15 and a maximum of 100 (M = 47.44, SD = 18.829), and with 
51% of females, and 49% of males. In order to carry out the trend analysis, we used 
all of the eight rounds of the European Social Survey, beginning in 2002 and conclu-
ding in 2016. We analyzed the mean values of each of the three dimensions of ratio-
nality and altruistic orientation within all of examined countries. Characteristics of 
samples from all waves are very similar to those in the last wave. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Self-evaluation of religiosity indicates moderate religiosity within sample (M 
= 4.37) (Table 2). Nearly half of the respondents rated their religiosity with 4 or less, 
while only 5% of them rated themselves as “Very religious”. Second, only 0.6% of 
respondents attend religious services apart from special occasions every day, and 
2.3% more than once a week, while more than 60% of them attend religious services 
never or “Less often” (M = 1.37). Similar share of respondents pray never or “Less often” 
apart from at religious services (M = 2.11). The results also indicated a high level of 
altruistic value orientation within sample (M = 4.96). Three-quarters of the sample 
rated importance to help people and care for others well-being as “Very much like me” 
and “Like me”. On the other side, only 2.6% of the sample answered on the same 
question as “Not like me at all” or “Not like me”.  
 
 
 
10 https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-
and-lending-groups 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Min Max M SD 
Important to help 
people and care 
for others well-
being 
24697 1 6 4.96 .929 
How religious are 
you 
24775 0 10 4.37 3.103 
How often attend 
religious services 
apart from special 
occasions 
24806 1 7 1.37 1.474 
How often pray 
apart from at 
religious services 
24646 1 7 2.11 2.401 
 
 
Regression analysis indicated the predictor structure of altruistic value 
orientation: the statistical significance of the model is determined, but it is very weak 
(r = .116, r2 = .013, Δr2 = .013, F(3/24413) = 110.267; p <.001). All religiosity dimensions 
are very weak predictors of altruistic value orientation (table 3). Statistical signify-
cance of the model could be result of the large sample size.  
 
Table 3: Multiple linear regression with altruistic value orientation as a dependent 
variable (n = 24,869). 
 
Independent 
variables 
B SE Beta t p 
How religious are 
you 
-0.014 0.003 -0.048 -5.328 .000 
How often attend 
religious services 
apart from special 
occasions 
-0.025 0.005 -0.039 -4.634 .000 
How often pray 
apart from at 
religious services 
0.039 0.004 0.1 10.76 .000 
R Square = 0.013; Adjusted R Square = 0.013; SEE = 0.922 
* B – unstandardized coefficients; SE – standard error; Beta – standardized coefficients 
 
The results generally indicate very weak relationship between all three di-
mensions of religiosity and altruistic value orientation. In further analysis, we exa-
mined trends of three dimensions of religiosity and altruistic value orientation by 
country, from 2002 to 2016. 
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Fig. 1: Trends of self-evaluation of religiosity by country 
 
 
 
First, as it can be seen from Figure 1, results indicate clear declining trends 
of self-evaluation of religiosity. The most striking cases are Sweden, Netherlands, and 
United Kingdom. 
 
Fig. 2: Trends of attendance of religious services by country 
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Our second dimension of religiosity, attendance of religious services apart 
from special occasions also clearly declined, especially in cases of Netherlands and 
Ireland (Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 3: Trends of frequency of praying by country 
 
 
 
Finally, the third dimension of religiosity, praying apart from at religious 
services, declined in all examined countries, and the fall is most evident in cases of 
Netherlands, Ireland and Finland (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 4: Trends of altruistic orientation by country 
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On the other side, there is clear rise of altruistic value orientation in exa-
mined countries. Sweden and Finland are the most striking cases (Fig. 4). The re-
sults, thus, indicate clear lack of relationship of religiosity and altruistic orientation, 
not only in the cross-section, but also through time.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis in our paper was twofold. Our results, first, confirmed many 
previous findings about the decline of religiosity in economically developed societies. 
This is the case with all three examined dimensions of religiosity – self-evaluation, 
frequency of attendance of religious services apart from special occasions and fre-
quency of prayer apart from at religious services. We identify a decline even in in-
trinsic religiosity, not just in indicators relating to the collective aspects of religiosity 
(and this is a fundamental difference from the researches conducted by Davie). Se-
cond, the results also showed a clear tendency of the rise of altruistic value orien-
tation among the populations of these countries. Both processes, the decline of reli-
giosity and the growth of altruistic orientation, could be explained by rising domi-
nance of self-expressive or emancipative values within these societies.  
Finally, we examined the cross-sectional relation between religiosity and al-
truistic value orientation at the individual level within these societies. The results in-
dicated very weak relationship. In economically developed societies, therefore, reli-
giosity is losing its importance, especially in relation to altruistic value orientation. 
We can assume that the degree of altruism is influenced by other indicators and that 
it does not depend on whether person is religious or is not. In this paper, we have 
analysed only one aspect of sociability but we underline that similar research should 
be done with some other value orientations in order to obtain a more complete and 
comprehensive analysis. Also, given the Bullivant’s research of religiosity of young 
people in Europe (especially of young people in Western societies), we can assume 
that the trend of declining religiosity, as well as the disappearance of the social role 
of religion will continue. 
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